

# SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	O/NE	101647-g	REGISTRY
SOURCE	Post Mortem NIE	11-6-54	CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.	2 February 1955		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE	Cy. # <u>100</u>		
COPY NO.	7 tot pgs		LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES	one (draft nie 11-6-54 pm)		
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS			

ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED	RELEASED	SEEN BY
			SIGNATURE AND OFFICE <i>R/Komer</i>
			DATE 10 Jul
JOB NO. <u>79R01012A</u>			
BOX NO. <u>36</u>			
FOLDER NO. <u>3</u>			
TOTAL DOCS HEREIN <u>    </u>			
DOCUMENT NO. _____			
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
IS DECLASSIFIED			
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C			
NEXT REVIEW DATE: <u>2011</u>			
AUTH: HR 70-2			
DATE: <u>4-30-81</u> REVIEWER: <u>009256</u>			

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED	DESTROYED	DISPATCHED ( <i>OUTSIDE CIA</i> )	
TO	BY ( <i>Signature</i> )	TO	
BY ( <i>Signature</i> )	WITNESSED BY ( <i>Signature</i> )	BY ( <i>Signature</i> )	
DATE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

101647-g

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

100

2 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Post Mortem on NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities  
and Probable Programs in Guided Missiles

1. Attached are the findings of the post mortem  
on NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs  
in Guided Missiles", dated 5 October 1954.

2. This text was reviewed by the IAC representatives  
on 2 February.

3. This paper will be put on the agenda of the IAC  
meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 8 February, at 10:45, for  
noting.

*Paul A. Borel*

PAUL A. BOREL  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 4-30-81 REVIEWER: 009256

TOP SECRET

C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y

2 February 1955

SUBJECT: POST-MORTEM ON NIE 11-6-54: SOVIET CAPABILITIES  
AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN GUIDED MISSILES

FINDINGS

1. The preparation of NIE 11-6-54, during the course of which an intensive effort was made to exploit every possible source of evidence, revealed serious gaps in our intelligence in this important field. In view of our conclusion that the US and its allies face a growing Soviet guided missile threat, including eventually an entirely new type of threat from intercontinental ballistic missiles, the lack of up-to-date intelligence is of critical significance to the intelligence community.

KEY INTELLIGENCE GAPS

2. Major Scientific and Technical Gaps. Although we have available conclusive evidence of the great postwar Soviet interest in guided missiles and numerous indications that the USSR has a large and active research and development program, we have no

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

firm intelligence on what particular missiles the USSR may presently be developing or may now have in operational use. Almost all of our intelligence on specific missile development work concerns German projects in the USSR and even then is at least a few years' old. We also need more up-to-date intelligence on Soviet research and development facilities and personalities connected with missile activities to permit us to determine more accurately the extent of the Soviet program.

3. Major Economic Gaps. In this field the major gap is our lack of any specific intelligence as to Soviet missile production. We have no evidence beyond the reported Soviet production of a few hundred V-1's and V-2's in 1947-1949. Our economic analysis also revealed the need for better data on Soviet prices and costs, and on Soviet production and consumption patterns in the key fields of electronics and precision mechanisms, and special fuels, where important bottlenecks are believed to exist.

#### INADEQUACY OF PRESENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

4. The basic reason for our lack of intelligence on the Soviet guided missile program is the inadequate collection effort

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

presently being devoted to this field. Although the intelligence community has increased its effort

25X1

25X1

devoted specifically to the collection and analysis of information regarding guided missiles. There continues to be an urgent requirement for increased intelligence collection relating specifically to types and numbers of guided missiles being developed, tested, and/or produced.

5. Guided missile intelligence has received an insufficiently high priority effort in the past. The IAC has recognized this problem by placing GM intelligence in the highest priority

25X1

6. There also continues to be a need for effective coordination of effort in all aspects of GM intelligence.

25X1

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

**Page Denied**

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied